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INTRODUCTION

So: property law is probably not your favorite subject.' It is
variously referred to by law students (and some lawyers) as "boring,"
"very boring," or even "incredibly boring." No less than Blackstone
himself acknowledged, in his commentaries, that the study of
property may "afford[ the student less amusement and pleasure"
than other areas of the law.2 Even I admit to similar feelings during
my law school career-a fairly honest acknowledgment from a
property law practitioner and professor.3
Why is it, then, that property gets such a bad rap? Is it because
it is not useful? Is it just a bunch of unhelpful arcana gathered for
the sake of compilation? Clearly not: whether you litigate, engage in

Assistant Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. J.D.,
Brigham Young University; B.A., Brigham Young University. Among others, I
gratefully acknowledge the help and assistance of Brigham Daniels, Associate
Professor of Law, at Brigham Young University Law School.
1. If you are a student, it is probably not your favorite subject to study; if you are
a practitioner, it is probably not your favorite subject to research; and, if you are an
academic, it is probably not your favorite subject to teach.
2. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *382.
3. Made, no less, in the introduction to a law review article regarding property
law.
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transactional law, do criminal defense, or practice almost any other
type of law, property issues (especially real property issues) are
significant and important.4 Is it because property law is so reliant on
ancient case law? Certainly, there may be some of that-few people
honestly like to read 200-year-old cases about noxious beasts.5 But
that is really not that much worse than 150-year-old cases about
shipping cotton to England6 or 650-year-old cases about a potential
assault at an English tavern.7
No, I posit that one of the primary reasons that the law of
property is so disfavored is because it is so difficult. And it is so
difficult because it is so vast and so varied. Tort, contract, criminal,
and other broad areas of law that serve as the "bedrock" of a legal
education start out challenging but eventually coalesce into a
comprehensible whole. These areas of the law were forged over
hundreds of years by the common law into rules that rely on
consistent principles and a fundamental structure largely applicable
throughout the country. Property law, on the other hand, starts out
wide-ranging and challenging and stays that way. It too is based on
common law principles, but these principles are distinctly less
consistent from state to state and even from county to county. It is, in
effect, an "infinite" series of rules that have "been heaped one upon
another for a course of seven centuries, without any order or
method.. . , [which make] the study of this branch of our national
jurisprudence a little perplexed and intricate."8
Think, for a moment, back to your first year property course, and
you will see what I mean. Recall some of the broad subjects you
studied there: acquisition by gift or by adverse possession, future
interests, co-ownership, marital interests, landlord-tenant law, and
transfer. All of these topics are important, and they all broadly come
together to create a reasonably reliable prism for a young lawyer
when thinking about property issues.9 But these areas are all riddled

4. It is probably fair to note that some areas of property law-notably, future
interests-come up in real world practice less often than others. But all substantive
fields have less utilized topics, and there is no denying the significant role that
property law plays in modern commerce and law. See, e.g., Dean Arthur R. Gaudio,
Electronic Real Estate Records: A Model for Action, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 271, 27274 (2002).
5. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), the seminal case seemingly
meant to confuse all first year law students, which is excerpted in, among others,
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 18 (7th ed. 2010).
6. See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch. Div.), excerpted in
CALAMARI ET AL., CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 290-91 (6th ed. 2011).
7. See I de S et Ux. v. W de S, At the Assizes, Y.B. Lib. Ass. fol. 99, pl. 60 (1348)
(Eng.), mentioned in WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 38 (4th
ed. 1971).
8. 2 BLACKSTONE, supranote 2, at *382-83.
9. See infra Part II.A.

2013]

WHY IS PROPERTY SO HARD?

507

with particularities and differing interpretations. Whichever
textbook you utilized in your first year class, odds are that it had
more note cases and side discussions than any of your other books
because those asides are necessary to acknowledge and discuss the
many divergent rules that exist throughout the country.

In A Theoretical Case for Standardized Vesting Documents, an
earlier publication to which I will refer in this Article as "SVD," I
wrote about this heterogeneity in the context of vesting documents. 10
Different jurisdictions utilize entirely different types of documents to
vest and transfer rights and ownership in property, a state of affairs
resulting in enormous confusion and cost.11 Upon further review and
discussion, however, it becomes apparent that this heterogeneity is
an even deeper and more significant aspect of property law. Indeed,
this variability is a unique characteristic that largely explains why
property law is practiced the way it is in America and why most law
students' and lawyers' first reaction to their property law classes is
the negative one discussed above.
This Article seeks to flesh out this characteristic and to analyze
it in depth. Part I begins this examination by setting up a taxonomy
for property law and then describing the heterogeneity inherent in
that context and the costs associated with that variability. Real
estate law has continually evolved throughout American historychanging from a small, local business to a large, national one,
spanning jurisdictional lines and limits-and it is the haphazard and
varied nature of this evolution that has created this difficulty and
cost. This is notable when contrasted with the homogeneity and
relative stability of other areas of the law. And it is particularly
notable when contrasted with one particular area of property law
itself: when it comes to property form, property law is remarkably
stable and predictable, and a closer examination of this exception to
property's broader heterogeneity leads to an enlightening analysis of
the underlying reasons for the larger heterogeneity that is the focus
of this article.
Part II undertakes just that sort of examination, examining
property form in terms of the numerus clausus. This theory, which
means "closed number," was first discussed by European scholars
and has more recently been propounded by Thomas Merrill and
Henry Smith to describe and explain the fact that the wider
variability of property law does not extend to common law

10. See Chad J. Pomeroy, A Theoretical Case for Standardized Vesting Documents,
38 OHIO No. U. L. REV. 957 (2012). Throughout this Article, I build upon the concepts
and research presented in SVD and have utilized some of the discussion and analysis
present there. I have included citations where appropriate, but many of the concepts
are too diffuse and generally serve as important background elements herein.
11. See id. at 961.
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restrictions on property types. 12 In particular, they argue that the
numerus clausus drives the standardization of property types by
implementing an informational cost-benefit analysis that focuses on
whether a new property type would provide helpful information to
interested parties, the unique benefit of which exceeds the marginal
informational costs thereof.13
In SVD, I argued that this same cost-benefit analysis should
apply to vesting documents,14 largely because of the similarity
between the informational burdens associated with new property
types and the heterogeneity costs associated with vesting document
heterogeneity. Here, I contend that this argument need not be
limited to vesting heterogeneity. Property is, at its heart, meant to
provide information and to put others on notice. Indeed, in many
ways, this is what property is: excluding others from a thing by
making them aware of your claim to it.15 The information burdens
identified by Merrill and Smith and the theoretical simplifying
pressure arising therefrom, then, are present in all areas of property
law. As such, the cost benefit analysis implemented by the numerus
clausus ought to act on all areas of variability for the greater good.
Having concluded as much, Part III applies this analysis to
property law generally by demonstrating its application to vesting,
co-ownership, and third-party property rights heterogeneity. Part IV
then builds upon this construction to explain why this has not yet
occurred in our system by focusing on the significant rollback costs
that would result from attempting to change established real
property practices and laws. Any such attempt would upset settled
expectation based upon prior precedent and hundreds of years of
recorded documents, creating much higher costs than those usually
associated with legal innovation.
The Article concludes that our property system is dangerously
inefficient and costly and that the numerus clausus analysis provides
a potentially adequate vehicle for addressing this problem, while

12. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3-4 (2000).
13. Id. at 68-70.
14. Here, as in SVD, these documents, which pass title from one party to another,
are referred to as "vesting documents." See generally Pomeroy, supra note 10. This is
not a term of art with a clear, settled definition. However, the meaning adopted herein
makes good sense and is useful herein. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1083 (abridged
6th ed. 1997) (defining "vest" as "to give an immediate, fixed right of present or future
enjoyment"); see also, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.13 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE §
5302.171 (West 2011); Sintz v. Stone, 562 So.2d 228 (Ala. 1990); Sun Valley Land and
Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 853 P.2d 607 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); Dixon v. Still, 121 A.2d 269
(D.C. 1956).
15. Property being "that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any
other individual in the universe." 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *2.
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acknowledging the very real costs associated with any such attempt.
I. VARIATION IN PROPERTY LAW
As introduced above, property law is varied and somewhat
confused, differing from one jurisdiction to another. In order to more
fully examine this heterogeneity, its costs, and a potential response
thereto, we first need to be more specific about what this variability
is and how it manifests itself. Identifying broad categories of study
within property law and examining how they fracture throughout the
country and the costs of those fractures permits us this level of
specificity, particularly when contrasted with a similar examination
of other broad areas of the law.

A. Taxonomy and Heterogeneity in Property Law
Creating any sort of taxonomy, much less one as sweepingly
comprehensive as is necessary to encompass an entire doctrinal
section of law, is problematic. All such areas of the law are
continually being reevaluated, refined, and reappraised.16 This is
particularly so with respect to "property law."17 As is the point of this
Article, "local and state property laws may substantially diverge
among different jurisdictions . . . and federal law in itself is highly
complicated and often obscure."18 Moreover, highly conceptual views
of legal doctrines are, by their very nature, subject to controversy and
criticism, given the wide range of potentially conflicting opinions and
viewpoints. Nonetheless, a conceptual taxonomy of property law is
"analytically and jurisprudentially essential" for an analysis such as
this, which involves a wide-reaching examination of a potentially
vast body of law.19 By organizing property law into a consistent
whole, we can attempt to "maintain[] a reasonable level of clarity and
certainty."20

16. See, e.g., John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New
Definition of Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1986) (describing recently modified
areas of property law).
17. Amnon Lehavi, The Taking/Taxing Taxonomy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1242
(2010).
18. Id. (citing Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism,
115 YALE L.J. 72, 74-75 (2005) (discussing competition over property regimes among
different jurisdictions); Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of
Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 889 (2007) (explaining how local zoning
restrictions change over time due to electoral changes or shifts in demographics)).
19. Lehavi, supranote 17, at 1276.
20. Id. As Professor Lehavi points out, such a taxonomy need not be overly
simplified or descriptive. See id. ("[Tlhe enterprise of legal taxonomy need not be
understood as necessarily yielding to formalist or positivist conceptions of law, in
which law purports to be capable of dividing the legal world into neat distinctive
categories that simply reflect objective legal reality."). This is so, even given a
relatively concise conceptualization. Indeed,
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Given the utility arising from such concision, a useful taxonomy
here should focus on simplicity but do so without sacrificing depth.
Though difficult, this is feasible, given most lawyers' largely shared
background. That background is first year property, a doctrinal
course we all share.21 Given that shared understanding, much can be
packaged and conveyed in a relatively straightforward manner. The
following taxonomy sets forth the basics of property law to a second
level of detail:
Property Law

Fundamentals

System of Estates

First

Possessory

ssessionTransaction
Property

Leshod
Righs

--

- O
inassesion

Transfer

Future

ership

Ln.
,

usqet

Land Use

Controls

Controls
Judicial
Legislativ
Controls

Prvate
-

Emn t
omain

This proposed taxonomy encompasses much of what we
generally consider to be property law: from the fundamental basis of
defining property, to the system of estates that we use to describe the
various types of property recognized at law, to transferring property,
to land use controls, most high-level property concepts are
represented.22 Of course, each of the lower, or second-level, concepts

the link between the number of legal categories and the simplicity
of the legal system is not straightforward. The question is not ...
how many different types of legal categories we have, and how easy
it is for us to classify a particular event or situation as falling
within a specific category, but also what is the type of legal norm
that applies to each category-i.e., whether the norm is designed as
a clear-cut rule that sets out a straightforward, relatively rigid
decree, or rather, as a broadly phrased standard that requires
further, later-stage crystallization.
Id. at 1277. In other words, the direct can, and does, encompass the complicated and
ambiguous. As such, although no taxonomy can ever perfectly identify and separate all
aspects of property law, it is possible to create a delineation that gives "a substantially
coherent sense to what is undoubtedly a very muddy world." Id. at 1278. In other
words, from a doctrinalist perspective, property "rights can be fully identified,
specified, and labeled." Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's
Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 615 (1998).
21. Even though complexities and ambiguities can arise in any area or at virtually
any level of abstraction, most of us return to a similar set of underlying concepts and
understandings. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108
YALE L.J. 1163, 1169-70 (1999) (setting forth a highly theoretical and very wellreceived discussion focused on what property really is).
22. Though not entirely drawn therefrom, this conceptualization owes much to the
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contain numerous doctrines, and many of those admit to their own
subdoctrines and, in many cases, there may be some ambiguity about
which idea goes where.
But perfection is not necessary. 23 This taxonomy encompasses
and categorizes property concepts sufficiently to permit comparison
and discussion. For instance, Merrill and Smith focus on the
uniformity of property type across time and geography.24 "Property
type," in their discussions is effectively the same as "system of
estates," above.25 Similarly, in SVD, I discuss the heterogeneity of
vesting documents. "Vesting documents" would fall under "land
transactions," above, along with other familiar concepts like brokers,
contract of sale, and financing.26 Each of these topics, or subjects,
encompasses roughly similar issues and legal controversies across
different jurisdictions.
This organizing lens, then, puts property concepts into digestible
compartments and so permits us to identify and compare like
concepts across different jurisdictions and in different circumstances.
And one area in which to perform this comparison is that of vesting

classic Dukeminier text on property law. See generally DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note
5.

23. See supra note 20. There are other potentially useful ways of putting together a
relevant taxonomy. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 21, at 1169 ("Ownership can be
analyzed in many dimensions. One useful framework distinguishes among categories
of ownership I call 'physical things,' 'legal things,' and 'legal relations.' While
distinctions among these three types of fragmentation are primarily useful as
organizational tools, the three categories do correspond to historical shifts in property
theory and to trends in constitutional decision-making."). The framework set forth
herein is useful because it is direct and reasonably concrete and therefore provides a
clear basis for comparison of its internal aspects.
24. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
25. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 23. Or, at least, it is the same as the list
of estates that are described thereunder. The system of estates is, in reality, itself a
taxonomy utilized to describe property with prescribed characteristics. See
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 183-316. Merrill and Smith's primary point is
that the types of property with those prescribed characteristics are limited-that there
is not an open or indefinite menu of property type or interests. See Merrill & Smith,
supra note 12, at 3. Of course, the. phrase "property interest" is itself open to
interpretation. See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 795
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[A] majority of the Justices of this Court are
already on record as concluding that the term 'property' sometimes incorporates
limiting characterizations of statutorily bestowed interests."). However, one
reasonable definition is "a legal right of one person enforceable against another person
or class of persons with respect to the possession, enjoyment and/or alienation of a
thing." Jeanne L. Schroeder, A Repo Opera: How Criimi Mae Got Repos Backward, 76
AM. BANKR. L.J. 565, 580 (2002). This makes sense, and is workable here, in that it
focuses on the rights flowing from a thing insofar as those rights define our view of
that thing, which ties together Dukeminier's text and Merrill and Smith's article.
26. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at xviii-xix (listing topics covered
under the heading "The Land Transaction").
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documentation.27 The United States contains more than 3000
counties and county equivalents,28 each of them has their own
recording system and customs, 29 and many of these utilize different
documents to provide evidence of claims upon property. This distinct
and clear lack of uniformity arises due to the nature of the American
recording system.30

The basic goal of property law is to define ownership rights in
property, 31 and doing so requires that parties be able to reasonably
obtain information regarding ownership rights and claims because
ownership rights do not exist in a vacuum. They exist only in relation
to other people and their rights, and that relationship cannot
function unless all interested parties can efficiently discover
everyone's relative rights.32 The recording system is what makes this
possible. It does so by incentivizing the recordation of vesting
documents, making those documents publicly known, and providing
the structure for title assurance. 33 Unfortunately, none of this
evolved uniformly. English common law had no real recording
system, as there was historically very little need for a centralized
source of written information.34 On the relatively rare occasions
when property was transferred, it was done so by way of a witnessed
ceremony. 35 The eventual solution to this state of affairs was the

27. See Pomeroy, supra note 10, regarding the variability of vesting documents.
This type of comparison can be done in virtually any area of property law. Other than
property type, all areas of property law are heterogeneous (hence the novelty of Merrill
and Smith's articles about the numerus clausus).
28. See How Many Counties Are There in the United States?, USGS,
http://gallery.usgs.gov/audios/124 (last updated Jan. 9, 2013).
29. See Dale A. Whitman, Are We There Yet? The Case for a Uniform Electronic
Recording Act, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 245, 269 (2002).
30. The development and history of the recording system helps explain the myriad
vesting documents that exist throughout the country and sheds some light on the
wider heterogeneity of property law generally. See generally Pomeroy, supra note 10;
John H. Scheid, Down Labyrinthine Ways: Recording Acts Guide for First Year Law
Students, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 91 (2002).
31. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577,
577 (1988) (indicating that property law works when its "rules ... signal to all of us, in
a clear and distinct language, precisely what our obligations are and how we may take
care of our interests").
32. People "need some means of assuring that they share a common understanding
of . . . rights." Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S373, S382 (2002).
33. See 14 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.01(1)(a) (Michael
Allan Wolfed., 2012) ("Recording acts, by definition, require the public preservation of
written documents of title to land, or of other written evidences of certain proprietary
interests.").
34. See id.
35. See Ray E. Sweat, Race, Race-Notice and Notice Statutes: The American
Recording System, 3 PROB. & PROP. 27, 27 (1989). Once the ceremony occurred,
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recording act, 36 which addressed the deficiencies of earlier statutes
by refusing to give priority to vesting documents that were not
recorded, thus incentivizing the public to create a reasonably
accessible and comprehensive database of information.37 However,
the recording acts failed to institute uniform requirements as to what
was to be recorded,38 predictably leading to an ad hoc evolution of
these documents. As such, deeds, mortgages, liens, and all sorts of
vesting documents look different across different jurisdictions.39 This

ownership was transferred and the prior owner could no longer affect title. See id.
This rudimentary ceremony institutionalized the "first in time, first in right" concept
of ownership, though it made it difficult for interested parties to gain any real
information because there was no permanent memorial of any transfer. See Chad J.
Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens on Real Property, 11 NEV. L.J. 139, 145-48 (2010)
(discussing the evolution of recording acts in the context of "surprise liens").
36. It took some time for the law to come to this rough conclusion. England passed
the Statute of Uses in 1535 and the Statute of Enrolments in 1536, both in an attempt
to force landholders to register property with a public official. See Sweat, supra note
35, at 27; George Lee Flint, Jr. & Marie Juliet Alfaro, Secured TransactionsHistory:
The First Chattel Mortgage Acts in the Anglo-American World, 30 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1403, 1433-34 (2004). These statutes, however, were ineffective. See Sweat, supra
note 35, at 27. As such, the Statute of Frauds followed in 1677, doing away with the
exceptions that so badly riddled the Statutes of Uses and Enrolments, and requiring
written documents to create or transfer real property interests in most situations. See
Alberto Luis Zuppi, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Comparative Study of the Common
Law, the Civil Law Tradition, and Lex Mercatoria, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 233,
236-37 (2007). The Statute of Frauds represented a step in the right direction but did
not systematically provide the type of information required because vesting documents
were physically conveyed to the transferee, along with the land. See Sweat, supra note
35, at 27. There was no central filing or storage system to track the documents that
evidenced ownership, so there was still no real way to be sure who owned what. See
Gaudio, supra note 4, 272-74. That is until the recording act came along. Today, all
fifty states and the District of Columbia have recording systems based upon the basic
recording act. See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Leading,
and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1364 (2010).
37. See Peterson, supra note 36, at 1366; Sweat, supra note 35, at 27-28.
38. The first modern recording act was adopted in 1640, and it did, in fact,
prescribe the format of the vesting document. See POWELL, supra note 33, §
82.01(1)(b); Sweat, supra note 35 at 27-28. As a matter of practicality, this seems
reasonable: if one is interested in providing useful information to a large population of
potentially interested third parties, it seems reasonable to standardize the
information. See Pomeroy, supra note 10, at 969-75. But this sort of requirement did
not last. Recording acts eventually permitted the recording of virtually any type of
document. See id. at 966-69. There are some rules that apply in most jurisdictions.
See Sweat, supra note 35, at 28. But the type and content of vesting documents has
never been systemically regulated.
39. This evolution can also be traced to the evolution of the documents themselves.
Consider, for example, transfer deeds. The earliest type of deed was the charter of
feoffment. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 585. This deed passed into
obsolescence with the passage of the Statute of Uses, in favor of a bargain and sale
deed, and, in the more than 300 years since then, different kinds of deeds have come
and gone, with the law presently settling on the general warranty deed, the special
warranty deed, and the quitclaim deed. Id. at 585-86. These deeds, however, are not
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is especially stark when considered in the context of the many
different recording systems present throughout the country. 40 Since
there is no central authority for these thousands of jurisdictions,
there are thousands of rules defining what is and is not recordable.41
This is the very definition of heterogeneity, and it is laced throughout
property law.
Another example of this variability in property law arises in the
context of "rights in property," classified under the top level concept
of "fundamentals," above. This concept of "rights in property"
pertains to the very basic rights that inhere in individuals based
upon their claims to an item of property. This is distinct from
"system of estates," which ultimately turns upon broadly recognized
characteristics of the property types at issue (related primarily to
duration and possessory rights) insofar as those characteristics
constitute the sole stable element of property law.42 Rights in
property, on the other hand, relate to other elements inhering to the
owners of the recognized estates, which affect the relative rights of
parties to the property but which do not change the essential nature
of the property. In other words, though there is an existing suite of
permissible and recognized estates, parties may be given different
rights to those estates across different jurisdictions.
As a case in point, it is well recognized that state law regarding
third-party rights in debtor property differs substantially from state
to state. 43 Creditors generally can seize debtor assets,44 but that
precisely the same and can vary significantly, even within the same category. See id.
at 585-90. As such, even when the evolution of a vesting document narrows itself into
a broad type or series of types, there is no true uniformity as to what gets recorded.
40. There are "approximately 3,600 counties, cities, or other municipalities" that
utilize a land recording system. See David E. Ewan, John A. Richards & Margo H.K.
Tank, It's the Message, Not the Medium!, 60 Bus. LAW. 1487, 1487 (2005).
41. Notably, there is no consistent requirement as to content: the recording office
is generally given basic parameters to review, which depend on the jurisdiction, and,
once those basic elements of a document are fulfilled, the office will record the
document. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 36, at 1365.
42. The entire premise of which rests upon the claim that there is only this one,
single instance of uniformity in property law. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 56.
43. See COMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 93137, pt. 1, at 16 (1973); R. Paul Barkes, Jr., Untwisting the Strong-Arm: Protecting
Fraud Victims from Bankruptcy Courts, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 653, 671 (1998) ("Relying
on state law also resulted in inconsistent treatment of property in different states.
Because each state had its own property laws, certain categories of property would
become part of the estate in one state but not in another."). The extent to which
property becomes part of the estate is a direct result of the extent to which a creditor
has rights to a debtor's property, which is, in turn, governed by varying state laws.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee for a bankrupt debtor has the power to exploit
defective filing by avoiding flawed transactions. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2006). If
avoided, the relevant property becomes available for distribution to all unsecured
creditors. This is known as the "strong-arm power," which affords a trustee the same
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ability-that fundamental property right in property "belonging" to
someone else-varies significantly from state to state, with each
jurisdiction creating slightly different rules.45 Very similarly, creditor
rights with respect to concurrent interest and married couples also
vary. Some states, for instance, extinguish a mortgage given by a
rights as a hypothetical creditor in a hypothetical proceeding, and effectively ensures
that a bankrupt estate will have the same rights as any other creditor. See REPORT OF
COMMN ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-137, at 18
(1973); see generally Barkes, supra note 43.
44. Either with respect to secured property or with respect to unsecured property,
upon obtaining a valid judgment. This material focuses upon the latter possibility.
45. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-6 (2012) ("The personal property of such resident,
except for wages, salaries, or other compensation, to the extent of the resident's
interest therein, to the amount of $3,000 in value, to be selected by him or her, and, in
addition thereto, all necessary and proper wearing apparel for himself or herself and
family, all family portraits or pictures and all books used in the family shall also be
exempt from levy and sale under execution or other process for the collection of
debts."); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-352b (2012) (establishing exemptions for the property
of "any natural person," including "[t]ools, books, instruments, farm animals and
livestock feed, which are necessary to the exemptioner in the course of his or her
occupation, profession or farming operation; . . . [p]ublic assistance payments[;] . . .
[h]ealth and disability insurance payments," alimony, child support, and items such as
homestead up to the value of $75,000, "[o]ne motor vehicle [up] to the value of [$3,500,]
. . . [w]edding and engagement rings[,] . . . and

"[alrms and military equipment,

uniforms or musical instruments owned by any member of the militia or armed forces
of the United States"); Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.430 (2012) (establishing exemptions from
"attachment and execution" for, among other things, any person's interest in property
such as "[hlousehold furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books,
animals, crops or musical instruments that are held primarily for personal, family or
household use of such person or a dependent of such person, not to exceed" aggregate
value of $3,000); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001-42.002 (West 2012) ("(a) The
following personal property is exempt under Section 42.001(a): (1) home furnishings,
including family heirlooms; (2) provisions for consumption; (3) farming or ranching
vehicles and implements; (4) tools, equipment, books, and apparatus, including boats
and motor vehicles used in a trade or profession; (5) wearing apparel; (6) jewelry not
to exceed 25 percent of the aggregate limitations prescribed by Section 42.001(a); (7)
two firearms; (8) athletic and sporting equipment, including bicycles; (9) a twowheeled, three-wheeled, or four-wheeled motor vehicle for each member of a family or
single adult who holds a driver's license . . . (10) the following animals and forage on
hand for their consumption: (A) two horses, mules, or donkeys and a saddle, blanket,
and bridle for each; (B) 12 head of cattle; (C) 60 head of other types of livestock; and
(D) 120 fowl; and (11) household pets."); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-106 (2012)
(establishing personal exemptions for, among other things, "(i) [t]he family bible,
pictures and school books; (ii) [a] lot in any cemetery or burial ground; [and] (iii)
[fjurniture, bedding, provisions and other household articles of any kind or character
as the debtor may select, not exceeding in all the value of four thousand dollars
($4,000.00)"). These statutes create personal exemptions and indicate the various
states' widely divergent policy decisions as to what types of property should be
protected from seizure by creditors. See, e.g., William Houston Brown, Political and

Ethical Considerationsof Exemption Limitations: The "Opt-out" as Child of the First
and Parent of the Second, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 149, 169-70 (1997). This variability is
not limited to the statutes creating personal exemptions. It is present in many
different areas relevant to creditor rights.
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predeceasing joint tenant, and others do not. 46 Likewise, some
jurisdictions permit tenants by the entirety to encumber the whole of
the property so held, and some do not.47 These examples, again, are
clear manifestations of substantial heterogeneity, particularly
considering the basic nature of the concept at issue. The right and
ability of a creditor to look to a debtor's property in the context of an
extension of credit is of significant consequence. Indeed, much of our
economy turns on this third-party right.48 That there is no single rule
or law upon which creditors can rely is again, then, a striking
example of the unduly heterogeneous and varied nature of property
law.
This raises the question as to why property law is like this. As
discussed below,49 other areas of law are not nearly as fractured and
disorganized. So why is property law different? As evidenced by the
evolution of the recording system, discussed above, there are
probably numerous historical and economic reasons that are unique
to property law that have contributed to this situation.50 There is also
the simple fact that real property is of infinite duration.
By virtue of its durability, land invites an intricate layering of
rights over time. Lawyers have never bothered to create an
elaborate doctrine of, say "estates in automobiles" or "covenants

46. See, e.g., Harms v. Sprague, 473 N.E.2d 930, 932-34 (Ill. 1984) (discussing the
extent to which a mortgage given by a joint tenant survives that mortgagor's
predeceasing another joint tenant, an issue that varies from state to state).
47. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism,
115 YALE L.J. 72, 83-84 (2005) ('Tenancy by the entirety has fallen into disfavor in
recent decades, leading to a remarkable diversity of approaches to such tenancies in
the United States."); see also Peter M. Carrozzo, Tenancies in Antiquity: A
Transformation of Concurrent Ownership for Modern Relationships, 85 MARQ. L. REV.
423, 430 (2001) ("Jurisdictions vary in their approaches and there is conflicting case
law arising even within the same jurisdiction.").
48. For example, in the context of real property, more than $1.2 trillion of
residential mortgages were extended to borrowers in 2011 alone. MBA Mortgage
Finance
Forecast,
MORTGAGE
BANKERS
ASS'N
(Jan.
18,
2012),
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Bulletin/InternalResource/79428_.pdf.
Doubtless, these loans were largely securitized ones on which the creditors could rely,
but they still serve to indicate the extent to which credit and property are related.
Though a wholesale evaluation of credit extension is beyond the scope of this Article, it
seems beyond question that creditors routinely rely on property (either directly
through securitized debt, or indirectly through unsecured debt extended on the basis of
financial strength) as the basis for an extension of credit.
49. See infra Part I.B.
50. One such possible reason is the changing importance of real property at the
time of the development of the American recording acts. See Pomeroy, supra note 10,
at 965 n.45 CAt the time of America's founding, land was shifting from its static role of
wealth production to the dynamic role of a commodity to be bought and sold." (citing
Gaudio, supra note 4, at 272)). This shift was particularly pronounced in America, and
it intensified throughout the industrial revolution, at the same time that the colonies
began to establish "American" land recording systems. See id.
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running with automobiles"; nor have they done so with any other
non-landed property. That is because after only a limited number
of years, any given automobile will end in the junk heap. This
finite lifespan keeps encumbrances on automobiles relatively
simple and few in number. Land, on the other hand, sticks around
indefinitely, while claims against land can go on and on, in layer
after layer, to be lost, found, banished, restored, relished, then lost
again to longstanding practice and prescription. This enduring
quality is one reason why claim-clearing doctrines like "adverse
possession" and prescription are essential with respect to land.51
This durability, and its concomitant layering of doctrinal
variation, certainly contributes to heterogeneity. It may also be the
case that land's fixed nature plays a role. Obviously, land does not
move-it is forever tied to a single jurisdiction. This inability to enter
any sort of stream of commerce or to seek out any other laws or rules
may remove any incentive any jurisdiction has to accommodate other
views or to evolve or attempt to reach any useful consensus. 52
Whatever the cause, this heterogeneity results in substantial costs
that are not present elsewhere in the law.

B. Taxonomy and Homogeneity in Other Areas of Law
The relatively extraordinary nature of property's heterogeneity
is particularly apparent when property is compared to other doctrinal
areas of the law. Take, for instance, contract law. As above, any sort
of taxonomy created here is going to be open to conflicting opinions
and viewpoints but doing so is, again, "analytically and
jurisprudentially essential"53 in that it permits us to compare
conceptual issues across any number of jurisdictions. And, again,
such a taxonomy can, and should, be comparatively simple and
drawn from most legal thinkers' shared background.
In that vein, the following chart sets forth the basics of contract
law to a second level of detail:

51. Rose, supranote 20, at 614.
52. Contrast this, for example, with the relatively uniform law relating to personal
property fostered by the Uniform Commercial Code. It may well be that the states,
fearing a flight of property and capital, were forced to engage economic forces in a
constructive manner, cooperated in order to come up with a relatively stable-and
hence relatively efficient, system-and so established a significantly stable rule of law
with respect to many aspects of personal property law. See, e.g., 8 WILLIAM D.
HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-102:1 (2012) (discussing
"the intent of the drafters of [UCC] Article 9"). As to why the states have not changed,
as the economic importance of real property has become more interjurisdictional, see
infra Part IV, which discusses the difficulty of attempting to change property law after
so many years of such heterogeneity.
53. Lehavi, supranote 17, at 1276.

518

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:2

As with the property taxonomy, this proposed schema generally
covers most of contract law.54 From what constitutes an enforceable
promise, to when a breach of such a promise has cognizably occurred,
to what damages are appropriate, this chart contains within a highlevel view of all basic contract issues with enough specificity to allow
for comparison and analysis.
With that in mind, let us examine the concept of modification.
This is a relatively high-level doctrinal concept; there are numerous
doctrines and subdoctrines within this issue, and, of course, there is
some ambiguity about which idea or doctrine goes where.55 That said,
it is clear that the law permits the modification of contracts and that
this concept generally arises in the context of breach or defense to
breach.56 And it is also relatively clear that this doctrine is consistent
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The law permits contract
modification if there is "consent and 'a meeting of the minds."'57 This

54. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KELLY, INSIDE CONTRACT LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY
(2011); Thomas P. Egan, Equitable Doctrines OperatingAgainst the Express Provisions
of a Written Contract (or When Black and White Equals Gray), 5 DEPAUL Bus. L.J.
261, 263-69 (1993) (outlining basic contract law doctrine).
55. And there is, of course, disagreement and confusion about how to parse out the
various doctrines.
56. See, e.g., Mary G. Jolley & Catherine M. Morrison, 1995 Developments in
Property Law, 29 IND. L. REV. 1035, 1047 (1996) (indicating that modification is a
generically available defense to a breach of contract claim); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1981).
57. Binninger v. Hutchinson, 355 So.2d 863, 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (citation
omitted).
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is basic, and it is stable.58 This large and significant area of contract
law is effectively identical across any number of varied jurisdictions
despite the development of the common law in different ways in
different states.59 The same can be said for other areas of contract
law, as well. Take, as another example, unjust enrichment. This
contract concept provides an alternative to standard contractual
requirements (similar to promissory estoppels) and is grouped, above,
under the general category of enforceable "promises."60 Again, the
law here is relatively clear and relatively stable.61

58. See, e.g., Ore-Ida Potato Prod., Inc. v. Larsen, 362 P.2d 384, 385 (Idaho 1961)
("This Court has followed the general rule of law that parties to an unperformed
contract may, by mutual consent, modify it . . . ."); Butler v. Wayne Co., 798 N.W.2d
37, 44 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]he party seeking to supplant the contract language
must show the parties had a meeting of the minds with respect to the new terms or
conditions so that there was an agreement to modify the contract." (quoting Port
Huron Educ. Ass'n v. Port Huron Area Sch. Dist., 550 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Mich. 1996)));
Olson v. Penkert, 90 N.W.2d 193, 203 (Minn. 1958) ("Parties can alter their contract by
mutual consent, and this . . . is merely the substitution of a new contract for the old
one." (citation omitted)); Bier Pension Plan Trust v. Estate of Schneierson, 545 N.E.2d
1212, 1214 (N.Y. 1989) ("Under general contract rules, an obligation may not be
altered without the consent of the party who assumed the obligation."); S.K. Apparel
Mfg., Inc. v. City of Houston, No. 14-01-00554-CV, 2002 WL 1822406, at *2 (Tex.
App. Aug. 8, 2002) ("To prove a modification, [a party] must show that [the other side]
(1) had notice of the change and (2) accepted the change." (citing Price Pfister, Inc. v.
Moore & Kimmey, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 341, 349-50 (Tex. App. 2001))); Duncan v. Ala. USA
Fed. Credit Union, Inc., 199 P.3d 991, 1002 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) ("Modification of a
bilateral contract requires a meeting of the minds as well as consideration separate
from that of the original contract.").
59. Of note, the common law differs from the Uniform Commercial Code in that
Article 2 does not require consideration to support modification. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1)
(2003). However, even this difference is consistent among the states.
60. The quotation marks here indicate that this broad category encompasses
concepts other than basic contract, concepts representing enforceable obligations, such
as unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel.
61. See, e.g., Flooring Sys., Inc. v. Radisson Grp., Inc., 772 P.2d 578, 581 (Ariz.
1989) (indicating that liability for unjust enrichment is appropriate when "it was not
intended or expected that the services be rendered or the benefit conferred
gratuitously, and that the benefit was not 'conferred officiously"' (citations omitted));
Reed Iron, Inc. v. Int'l Sales and Serv. Corp., 200 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Colo. App. 2008)
("The test for recovery under an unjust enrichment theory, as stated by the Colorado
Supreme Court, requires a showing that: '(1) at plaintiffs expense, (2) defendant
received a benefit (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for defendant to
retain the benefit without paying."' (quoting Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179
P.3d 998, 1007 (Colo. 2008)); Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 936 A.2d 343,
351 (Md. 2007) ("Unjust enrichment consists of three elements: 1. A benefit conferred
upon the defendant by the plaintiff; 2. An appreciation or knowledge by the defendant
of the benefit; and 3. The acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under
such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit
without the payment of its value."); Graves v. Berkowitz, 15 S.W.3d 59, 61 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) ("The essential elements of a quasi contract action of unjust enrichment
are: (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the
defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance and retention of the benefit under such

520

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:2

This point can be made over and over again, with respect to all
sorts of contractual concepts: the law simply is not that variable.62
This is all to the good, of course. One of the most fundamental
purposes of contract law (if not the fundamental purpose) is to ensure
that parties can negotiate, act, and reach agreement with a degree of
certainty. This relative jurisdictional stability significantly increases
the confidence of market participants, who do not have to wonder
whether their affairs will be ordered differently in different
jurisdictions, thus stimulating positive market activity.63 That makes
its stark contrast to property law all the more notable, and all the
more remarkable. Even though a stable property regime would create
certainty and incentivize commercial activity in much the same way
that stable contract law does,64 property law has simply, and clearly,

circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without
paying the value thereof."); Credit Inst. v. Veterinary Nutrition Corp., 62 P.3d 339, 344
(N.M. Ct. App. 2002) ("To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, 'one must show
that: (1) another has been knowingly benefitted at one's expense (2) in a manner such
that allowance of the other to retain the benefit would be unjust."' (quoting Ontiveros
Insulation Co. v. Sanchez, 3 P.3d 695, 698 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000))); Stoeckinger v.
Presidential Fin. Corp. of Del. Valley, 948 A.2d 828, 833 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) ("The
elements of unjust enrichment are benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff,
appreciation of such benefits by defendant, and acceptance and retention of such
benefits under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant to retain
the benefit without payment of value." (quoting Styer v. Hugo, 619 A.2d 347, 350 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993))); Boyce v. Freeman, 39 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 2002) ("A party who is
seeking damages on the basis of unjust enrichment must prove four elements: (1)
Valuable services were rendered, or materials furnished, (2) to the party to be charged,
(3) which services or materials were accepted, used and enjoyed by the party, and, (4)
under such circumstances which reasonably notified the party to be charged that the
plaintiff, in rendering such services or furnishing such materials, expected to be paid
by the party to be charged.").
62. Again, within the context of the broader taxonomy set forth above, this is a
generality. There is considerable room for disagreement as to the placement and
definition of some of these concepts, and there is, of course, some heterogeneity in
every conceptual area of the law, including contract law. Compare, e.g., Kewin v. Mass.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Mich. 1980) (applying Michigan law and
limiting contract recovery measurement of damages in a bad faith claim to stated
policy amount), with Jarvis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 448 A.2d 407, 410 (N.H.
1982) (applying New Hampshire law and permitting recovery of foreseeable losses
exceeding policy amount in the same circumstances). The point stands, however, that
contract law is remarkably uniform when contrasted with property law.
63. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 117 (Aspen 8th ed.
2011) ("The basic aim of contract law . . . is, by deterring people from behaving
opportunistically toward their contracting parties, to encourage the optimal timing of
economic activity and (the same point) obviate costly self-protective measures.");
Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in
Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1525-26 (2006) ("The purpose served by
third-party enforcement [of contracts] is to provide stability and predictability as
incentives to parties to engage in non-simultaneous exchanges.").
64. In much the same way that contractual certainty supports the confidence
necessary for parties to engage in commercial activity, interjurisdictional clarity of
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eschewed this approach.

C. Accounting for Heterogeneity
So there is significant heterogeneity in property law and not in
other areas of law-so what: why is this such a problem? The
primary problem is cost. The heterogeneity of property law creates
costs, both in terms of actual transaction costs and in terms of
mistakes made and errors overlooked.65 Because the law is so
variable, it is time consuming and difficult to understand the law and
to gain confidence in one's rights and actions. In other words, the
wide-ranging nature of property law, so hated by students, is also
ultimately hated by market participants and practitioners. In SVD, I
analyzed this cost for vesting heterogeneity by measuring the extent
to which doctrinal variation detracted from the ability of the
recording system to communicate information. But, again, the issue
is broader than that. It is not just the recording system that is meant
to provide information-it is all of property law.
In a very real sense, property law is primarily concerned with
providing information to others. Again, let us return to Blackstone's
famous definition of property: "[Tihat sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe."66 Under this view, property rights are defined with respect
to an actual thing that is possessed or "owned" (as opposed to being
defined with respect to the actors or individuals involved),67 and that
"thing" therefore broadcasts the rights and obligations inherent
therein "to the world."68 But this broadcast is no good if nobody
understands it. "In order to avoid violating another's property rights,
[individuals] must ascertain what those rights are. In order to
acquire property rights, [individuals] must measure various
attributes, ranging from the physical boundaries of a parcel, to use

property law would permit parties to engage in property transactions without fearing
unknown or unclear standards or rules. See Trebilcock & Leng, supra note 63, at 152526. This fear undermines commercial activity to the extent that it prevents anyone
from engaging in a transaction they otherwise would have engaged in and to the
extent that it imposes additional transactional costs on commercial activities. Though
this may not have been a particularly widespread problem during the early
development of property law, when property tended to be a local concern, it is certainly
more broadly troublesome now that property is a transjurisdictional issue of
significant commercial importance. See supra note 50.
65. See generally Pomeroy, supra note 10, at 980-84 (discussing these costs in the
context of vesting documents, specifically).
66. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *2.
67. This is a traditional view of property, in contrast to a more recent view of
property rights as a malleable "bundle of rights." See Pomeroy, supra note 10, at 981
n.143.
68. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001).
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rights, to the attendant liabilities of the owner to others . . . ."69 If
they cannot do that, property law fails (at least to some extent).
And so it is that the broad-based heterogeneity, outlined above,
compromises all of property law, by making the inherent provision of
information by items of property less useful and less effective. Again,
with respect to the recording system, this is fairly easy to perceive.
Simply look at the incentives fostered by the typical American
recording system as a manifestation of property law, generally. This
system effectively forces parties to record by invalidating unrecorded
transfers in favor of subsequent transferees.70 This creates
certainty-voiding prior, unrecorded transfers incentivizes regular
recording, which, in turn, ensures the propagation of information.71
This informational certainty, and its power to avoid injury, is not
unlimited,72 but it is clearly the primary goal of the recording system,
which is consistent with the nature of property. That goal, however,
is significantly undermined by the vesting heterogeneity that
subsists at the very heart of the system. Or, put differently, vesting
heterogeneity is inefficient.73 A wide range of potentially recordable
documents negatively affects informational certainty because it

69. Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 26; see also Rose, supra note 31, at 577
(indicating that property law functions properly when its rules "signal to all of us, in a
clear and distinct language, precisely what our obligations are and how we may take
care of our interests"). This is a fundamental difference from other areas of law,
focusing on (and necessarily arising from) a concrete, physical object.
70. See Dan S. Schechter, Judicial Lien Creditors Versus Prior Unrecorded
Transferees of Real Property:Re-Thinking the Goals of the Recording System and Their
Consequences, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 109 (1988).
71. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possessionand Ownership:
An Examinationof the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 183 (1983).
72. If certainty were the only goal of the recording system, then all unrecorded
interests would be void, and that is not how the system operates. "Instead, an
unrecorded transfer" is void "only when a" qualified, later transferee (one who has
exchanged value for his interest and who is ignorant of prior interests) challenges the
earlier, unrecorded conveyance. See Schechter, supra note 70, at 110; see also, e.g.,
Cunningham v. Norwegian Lutheran Church of Am., 184 P.2d 834, 836, 840 (Wash.
1947) (upholding a bona fide purchase for value even though buyer purchased for only
$100 real estate valued at $1,500). This has been termed a "cost avoidance" rationale:
the recording system permits interested actors (those exchanging value for a property
interest) who need ownership information (those who do not already possess such
information) to obtain that information in a reliable manner. See Schechter, supra
note 70, at 119. This deviation from uniformly voiding all unrecorded transfers
necessarily results in some uncertainty but still comports with a system focused
primarily on the provision of information.
73. From a positive perspective, economic analysis can be utilized to explain the
development and current state of the law regarding the heterogeneity of vesting
documents. See Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV.
757, 768-69 (1975). As such, the question would be whether the current system of
permitting the recording of differing types of vesting documents is economically
justifiable, and the answer to that question is "no."
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makes organization and searching difficult and expensive and so
effectively restricts the access sought by interested actors.
Similarly, the variation of third-party rights in debtor property
discussed above also undermines the innate provision of information
that is so essential to our concept of property and ownership. Indeed,
a creditor's need to perceive and assess the rights and values of a
potential debtor's rights in property is, if anything, even more clear
and important than in connection with the recording system.
Potential lenders, in assessing whether to extend credit to potential
debtors, necessarily attempt to determine the ability of the debtor to
pay back the debt.74 They do this in a variety of ways, but a very
significant part of what they must do is to evaluate their ability to
ultimately pursue recourse from the assets of a debtor. This is
particularly important in the context of unsecured lending.
In a secured lending situation, a creditor theoretically has the
ability to collect from the piece of property securing the loan.75 An
unsecured lender, on the other hand, has no collateral to which it can
turn upon default. As such, it must seek recourse by attempting to
extract value from the assets of the debtor.76 And, in assessing its
ability to do this, it will attempt to rely on the information broadcast
by property, discussed above. Creditors will, ex ante, ask for financial
statements and balance sheets and any other indication of ownership
because they generally believe that those assets, if owned by the
debtor, are available to the debtor (and its creditors) to satisfy
claims. But this is not necessarily so.
As indicated above, the law has a fairly clear policy of not
permitting creditors access to all assets. 77 This makes some sense

74. This is, of course, a matter of common sense. Creditors must make this
assessment, and any failure or mistake in doing so is likely to have significant
consequences. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 18-29 (2009)
(discussing the abandonment of this practice by secured lenders in the early 2000s and
the role this abandonment played in the real estate meltdown of the last several
years). The causes of this failure have been the subject of much speculation, but there
is no real doubt that, whatever its cause, the failure to adequately assess debtor
reliability ended in disaster. See Michael Lewis, The End, PORTFOLIO, December 2008,
http://www.mutualfundsbureau.com/docs/PortfolioMagazine
4
available at
at
Article.pdf (noting that, between 2000 and 2005, subprime lending had grown from
$130 billion to $625 billion).
75. This is so if the value of the collateral available to the creditor (i.e., not exempt
under law or subject to a senior lien) equals or exceeds the amount of the debt. If this
is not the case, the loan is "undersecured," and the collateral will not make the lender
whole if the debtor defaults, though it may cover some of the debt.
76. This reliance on other assets may or may not involve litigation. Either a
creditor will pursue a judgment and ultimately attempt to levy on the debtor's assets,
or the creditor will negotiate a resolution with the debtor. Likely, both of these courses
will be pursued simultaneously. In either case, the creditor will have to look to the
debtor's assets (or future assets) for recompense.
77. See supra note 45.
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from a policy perspective78 and is not necessarily a problem from a
potential creditor's (and, hence, from an economic generation)
perspective. So long as creditors can reasonably and accurately
assess what will be available, prior to engaging in a credit
relationship, their eventual lack of recourse is not problematic, as
they can accurately include that in the overall calculus of how much
to lend, to whom, and under what terms. The difficulty comes, then,
not from the concept of debtor asset protection, but from the extent to
which that concept is heterogeneous. Again, creditors seek out this
information because they need it so that they can order their affairs.
But this task is difficult because the law is heterogeneous-i.e., it
varies enormously from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Creditors cannot
easily assess their potential rights merely by assessing the property
interests of potential debtors. Instead, they must discern just what
those rights mean in the relevant jurisdiction. This constitutes a
potentially significant transactional cost, creating inefficiency.79 As
such, the goal of property is once more undermined because of its
heterogeneous nature.
This inefficiency, this inability of property to serve its purpose
due to the difficulty of deciphering what rights flow from what
property, then, is present throughout the law of property. Though it
is likely impossible to accurately estimate the size and scope of this

78. See Brown, supra note 45, at 169 ("The purposes behind exemptions are
inseparable from social policies endorsed by legislative bodies and courts, such as the
provision to the deserving debtor of 'property necessary for his physical survival;' the
protection of 'the dignity, cultural and religious identity of the debtor;' the 'enablement
of the debtor's financial rehabilitation and future earning ability;' the protection of the
'debtor's family from the adverse consequences of impoverishment;' and, a shifting of
the burden for 'providing the debtor and his family with minimal financial support
from society to the debtor's creditors,' who will receive less from the debtor as a result
of available exemptions." (citations omitted)).
79. See infra Part III.B. There is, in other words, a failure in the broadcast that
systemically flows from property, creating difficulty both for the immediate parties
concerned and for all parties, who must always be on the lookout for new, or different,
rights that upset standardized calculations. These information costs are what create
the inefficiencies outlined herein. Note that an implication of this extension of the
numerus clausus concept, as identified and defined by Merrill and Smith, is that the
informational burdens identified therein are associated with the entire spectrum of
property law. Heterogeneity in the context of any of the taxonomically distinct
elements of property law set forth above creates informational burdens and so fosters
inefficiency. This potentially contradicts Merrill and Smith insofar as their theses
imply that heterogeneity in property format would uniquely foster these sorts of costs.
Of course, Merrill and Smith could be correct if one could somehow demonstrate that
property format heterogeneity does foster informational burdens, if not uniquely, then
at least to a higher degree than heterogeneity in other areas of property law. If not
this, though, it appears that heterogeneity creates informational burdens wherever it
exists in property law and that Merrill and Smith have misdiagnosed the reason for
property's peculiar homogeneity in the context of property format. That leaves open
the question, then, as to what is the true cause of this peculiarity.
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cost, it is perhaps possible to begin to understand it by looking at the
title insurance industry. Title insurance effectively provides
indemnification against the loss that occurs if title proves to be
inferior to what the title company indicated in an issued title policy.80
In other words, it protects parties from misinterpreting the rights
that flow from property-i.e., from misunderstanding the information
broadcast by the thing itself-the danger of which is a direct
outgrowth of the variability set forth above.81 Accordingly, title
insurance is necessary due to the inefficiency of the property system,
and the money spent on this form of protection can be viewed as
some indication of just how pernicious and costly this inefficiency
truly is. 82 And the amount of money spent is huge. The title
insurance industry is a multibillion-dollar industry, generating $8.7
billion dollars in premiums in 2010 alone.83 The cost associated with
heterogeneity, then, is huge.
However, this cost is not quite as large as it could be because
there is a single area of property law that is an exception to the rule
of heterogeneity and its cost. That exception is in the area of property
format (or system of estates, in the taxonomy created above). An
examination of this homogenous outlier, and the theory previously
put forth to explain it, is helpful here.
II. PROPERTY FORM AND THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS
The exception to heterogeneity in property law arises in the
context of property form. In this setting, courts have been strikingly
hostile to the variability so endemic to other areas of property law.
Seizing upon this, Merrill and Smith have propounded what they call
the numerus clausus theory,84 which attempts to explain why
property law is uniform in only this single area. 85 This theory turns

80. See John C. Murray, Title and Survey Issues in Commercial Real Estate
Transactions, in UNDERSTANDING THE SOPHISTICATED REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION 55,
57-58 (Practising Law Institute ed., 2003).
81. See also infra Part II.B.
82. Title insurance would still be purchased even if the title was perfectly
understandable from a legal point of view, as there are reasons other than the legal
inefficiency of property law to insure title (e.g., poor record-keeping, mistrust of
parties, etc.). So the entire cost of title insurance cannot be relied on here as a proxy.
But it seems eminently reasonable to believe that some element of that cost is
attributable to the systemic inefficiency identified herein such that the cost of title
insurance is, at least, instructive as to the magnitude of the issues involved.
83. Press Release, A.M. Best Co., A.M. Best Special Report: Despite Economic
Turbulence, Title Industry Outlook Remains Stable (Oct. 10, 2011), available at
http://www3.ambest.com/press/framepress. asp (accessed by selecting "October 2011"
from "View by Month" menu, then selecting article).
84. A theory I have previously relied upon extensively. See generally Pomeroy,
supranote 10.
85. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12. See generally Henry E. Smith, Community
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upon Merrill and Smith's view of the informational burdens inherent
in "new" property types. 86 These topics are helpful here, as they
provide the basis for an expansion of the numerus clausus theory to
property law as a whole.
A. An Exception to Heterogeneity and the Numerus Clausus
The numerus clausus, as developed by Merrill and Smith,
provides a reason as to why property law restricts parties' discretion
to customize their ownership interests.87 Simply put, people cannot
create different types of property because property law recognizes
only a limited number of property forms or types and refuses to allow
parties to stray from these set categories.88
Historically, the courts have enforced this rule either by striking
down parties' attempts to create new interests or by recasting any
attempted "fancy" as something else that qualifies as a more
traditional property form.89 This can be seen with respect to virtually
all subcategories of "property form,"90 starting with estates. There
are five types of possessory estates ("the fee simple absolute, the
defeasible fee simple, the fee tail, the life estate, and the lease"); a
similar number of future interests (reversions, termination powers,
remainders, and executory interests); and the courts rarely vary from
these categories.91 This strict approach extends to the other
and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 5 (2009); Merrill & Smith,
supra note 68.
86. See Merrill & Smith, supranote 12, at 40-42.
87. See id. at 3.
88. See id.; see also Keppell v. Bailey, (1834) 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch.) 1049
("[Incidents of a novel kind [cannot] be devised and attached to property at the fancy
or caprice of any owner."). This case is heavily relied upon by Merrill and Smith, who
use its terminology to describe their thesis that property law will not permit "fancies."
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 25-26.
89. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 11-12. Therein, Merrill and Smith make
their point with a classic example: a lease "for the duration of the war" would almost
certainly not be enforced according to its terms. Seeking to place such a lease within
one of the four traditionally recognized types of leasehold interests, a court would
probably shoehorn the lease into category of periodic tenancy or a tenancy at will. See
id. at 3 (citing 1 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 11.01, at 11-2
(Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1999)); CHARLES DONAHUE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 457 (3d ed.
1993); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 204 (4th ed. 1998); LEWIS M.
SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 61, at 45-46 (2d ed. 1956)).
Merrill and Smith believe that courts and scholars generally honor this conception of
property: "They treat previously-recognized forms of property as a closed list that can
be modified only by the legislature." Merrill & Smith, supranote 12, at 10-11. But see
Garner v. Gerrish, 473 N.E.2d 223, 225 (N.Y. 1984) (characterizing an interest as "a
life tenancy terminable at the will of the tenant").
90. See supra Part I.A.
91. Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 13; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note
5, at 183-316; see also, e.g., Stuehm v. Mikulski, 297 N.W. 595, 603 (Neb. 1941)
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subcategories of property form as well. Concurrent interests,
nonpossessory interests, personal property, intellectual property, and
lienhold interestS92 all generally receive the same treatment: even
though the courts never use the term numerus clausus, they
steadfastly follow its precepts and deny parties the right to create
new interests of their own choosing.93
Interestingly, our laws do this without explicitly recognizing or
explaining why-that is, without even acknowledging the numerus
clausus principle. This differs from civil law countries, where the
concept is explicitly recognized and referred to by name: the numerus
clausus, which means "the number is closed.94
The concept is less developed in the United States, and Merrill
and Smith view it as a "stealth doctrine,"95 having identified a
relatively unknown decision, which they endorse as a "leading case,"
as an example of how the concept has worked its way into our
jurisprudence with little fanfare.96 In Johnson v. Whiton, Royal

(Carter, J., concurring) ("It is essential that titles and estates in land be definite and
certain. It is not a field in which the court should undertake to establish that it is
liberal and modernistic in keeping pace with changing conditions. The creation of
hybrid estates unknown to the common law is to be deplored.").
92. American common law recognizes a very basic catalogue of concurrent
interests: "tenancy in common; joint tenancy; marital property; trusts; and
condominiums, cooperatives, and time-shares." Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 15
(citing Powell's treatise on real property). The same can be said of nonpossessory
interests: easements, covenants, equitable servitudes, and profits have been
remarkably stable and unchanged by the courts. See id. at 16-17. Similarly, almost all
attempts to create nuanced forms of personal property take place in the context of
trust law. See id. at 17-18. Intellectual property also shows the effects of the numerus
clausus in that there has historically been no real protection for creative property
outside the legislative dictates of patent, copyright, trademark, and trade secret. See
generally DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 56-96. Finally, almost all secured lien
interests in real property are either a mortgagor interest or a beneficiary interest
arising from a deed of trust. See, e.g., AMY MORRIS HESS ET AL.,TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 29 (3d ed. 2007).
93. This view is a widely cited one, but it is not the only explanation for the
numerus clausus. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 21, at 1170 (arguing that undue
fragmentation of property interests would create inefficiency, as the costs of such
fragmentation would not be born by the creators thereof).
94. Merrill and Smith acknowledge as much, citing to a number of European
writers who have previously written on the topic. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12,
at 4 (citing Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus
Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD SERIES 239, 241 (John
Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987); KARL-HERMANN CAPELLE, BORGERLICHES RECHT:
SACHENRECTH 13 (1963) ("Numerus Clausus, Typenzwang oder Typenfixierung");
KLAUS SCHREIBER, SACHENRECHT 28-29 (1993) ("Typenzwang und Typenfixierung"));
see also, e.g., J. Michael Milo, Property and Real Rights, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAw 587, 593-600 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006); Roderick R.M. Paisley, Real
Rights: PracticalProblems and Dogmatic Rigidity, 9 EDIN. L. R. 267, 267 (2004) (Scot.).
95. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 20-23.
96. See id. at 20-21 (discussing Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1893)).
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Whiton devised land to his granddaughter "and her heirs on her
father's side."97 The court construed this as an attempt to create a
new type of estate and disapproved, instead ruling that Royal's
granddaughter received a fee simple absolute.9s Merrill and Smith
see this as a seminal case because it so nicely fits their description of
the numerus clausus as a widely controlling, but subtle and
unnamed, rule of law.99
So we are left with a subtle doctrine, fashioned as an explanation
to an exception to the extreme variability present in property law.
The courts may not cite the principle, and historical treatises may
not recognize it in this country, but Merrill and Smith believe that
the concept is important and that it explains a large swath of
American property jurisprudence.oo Their thinking is both
interesting and relevant to our discussion of the wider heterogeneity
of property law generally.

B. InformationalBurdens
According to Merrill and Smith, the numerus clausus, as applied
here, can be explained by focusing on informational costs and
burdens.i0 Property law, they point out, focuses on the thing and the
rights flowing from that thing. 102 This focus on the in rem (as opposed
to the in personam) nature of property is the basis for Blackstone's
famous definition of property as "that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe."103 In other words, rights are defined with respect to an
item that is possessed or "owned," as opposed to being defined with
respect to the owners thereof.104
As such, property only "works" when the thing at issue properly
communicates the rights inherent therein-i.e., the property itself

97. Johnson, 34 N.E. at 542.
98. See id.
99. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 21-22, 69.
100. See id. at 21-22.
101. See id. at 53. But see Heller, supra note 21, at 1176-78 (suggesting, in contrast,
that the purpose of the numerus clausus is to promote the easy transferability of
property).
102. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 68, at 359.
103. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *2. This definition of property has been
criticized as out of date. See, e.g., Lehavi, supra note 17, at 1245. Nevertheless, it still
has substantial, and enduring, appeal. See, e.g., Rose, supranote 20, at 602 ("[Mlodern
legal scholars refer to it often, whether they do so with approbation or disapproval.").
104. This is in contrast to the view of property rights as a malleable "bundle of
rights." Compare ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 9-86 (R.L. Meek et al.
eds., 1978), and JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 164
(1945), with Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 370
(1954) (characterizing property as "an exclusive right to control an economic good").
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broadcasts the rights and obligations associated with its ownership
"to the world," and the world must understand that broadcast so that
everyone can recognize and respect those rights which ultimately
constitute "property."105
In order to avoid violating another's property rights, [individuals]
must ascertain what those rights are. In order to acquire property
rights, [individuals] must measure various attributes, ranging from
the physical boundaries of a parcel, to use rights, to the attendant
liabilities of the owner to others (such as adjacent owners).106
Of course, third parties have to expend time and resources to
gain this knowledge, and unusual property forms increase the cost of
doing this. It is this cost (this informational burden) that Merrill and
Smith focus on, claiming that what the numerus clausus is really
doing is making it easier on others to understand what is being
broadcast in order to decrease the costs inherent in property law.107
In other words, what the courts are truly concerned about is that new
types of property interests will create information costs for third
parties.10 The numerus clausus, then, simply guards against the
informational burdens that would result from recognizing the many
unique property rights that parties would develop of their own
accord.109

105. Merrill & Smith, supranote 68, at 359.
106. Merrill & Smith, supranote 12, at 26.
107. See id. at 25-26 (relying upon Keppell v. Bailey, (1834) 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch.)
1049). The relationship between heterogeneity of property forms and higher cost
arises, with respect to the parties to the transaction, due to the fact that all
communication must be processed in order to be understood. This processing requires
one to expend resources (i.e., incur cost). Expanding the type or range of information
being communicated involves changing what rights are possible and will necessarily
increase that cost. The relationship between heterogeneity and cost does not stop at
the parties with a direct connection to a piece of property, though. The duty to
understand property rights is not personal. It attaches to everyone: in order for
property to "work," everyone must clearly and efficiently perceive everyone else's
property rights. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 68, at 359. Unfortunately, this
universality amplifies the costs of communication because everyone (even third parties
who presumably have no need to understand the rights and responsibilities of a given
property owner) bears them. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 27 (citing
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Unity of Property Rights 5-6 (Nov. 17, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Yale Law Journal)). It is this bearing of cost
by third parties that Merrill and Smith focus on. Property owners will not take
adequate account of these third-party costs because they do not bear them, so property
can function as intended only so long as it remains simple and standardized such that
"everyone else" can understand the broadcast easily and with little cost. See id. at 28.
108. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 26-27.
109. Limiting the types of property forms allows everyone "to limit his or her
inquiry to whether the interest does or does not have the features of [pre-existing]
forms." Id. at 33. "Perhaps the key point about the numerus clausus is informational:
The forced standardization of property forms creates a kind of shorthand which, in
turn, reduces information costs." Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of
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And this generally applies to property law. Merrill and Smith
utilize the numerus clausus to explain the extraordinary
homogeneity of property form, but this doctrine and its
underpinnings have a much broader application than that.
III. A BROADER THEORY OF HOMOGENEITY
The numerus clausus, insofar as it is driven by an underlying
concern for informational burden and cost, theoretically should apply
to all of property law. Heterogeneity drives up costs everywhere, not
just in the category of property form, and the manner in which the
numerus clausus could apply elsewhere is easily conceivable. This
section examines this limited application by explaining what a widely
applicable numerus clausus would look like and how it could apply to
all areas of property law.

A. What
In proposing that a numerus clausus type of analysis could apply
broadly in a manner similar to that in which it has previously been
applied to property form, it is helpful to start by doing so in a number
of concrete doctrines of property law.' o Let us start with the property
subcategory of vesting.111 The numerus clausus should theoretically
apply to vesting because the informational burdens of property (as
defined and described by Merrill and Smith) are increased by vesting
heterogeneity in the same way that they would be increased by
property form heterogeneity.112
In particular, the vesting heterogeneity costs exist insofar as
vesting document variability "detracts from[] the underlying purpose
of the recording system, which is to make information available to
the right parties at the right time."113 This is, in essence, the same
concern as the informational burdens identified by Merrill and Smith
in the property form context in that it similarly focuses on "the
difficulty and expense others will encounter in attempting to
understand the ownership rights of a particular piece of property."114

Notice in Commercial Finance Law, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 497 (2005).
Without that shorthand, there is potential for the parties to "mistakenly make
inconsistent uses of the asset or underuse the asset" or to misallocate resources due to
a fear "that the other will ... opportunistically assert rights that properly belong to
the other." Hansmann & Kraakman, supranote 32, at S382.
110. See supra Part I.A.
111. See Pomeroy, supra note 10, at 987.
112. This similarity is not exact. Merrill and Smith's focus on exogenous costs is not
parallel here and does not directly drive the application of the numerus clausus to the
heterogeneity of vesting documents. See id. at 985-87.
113. Id. at 985.
114. See id. (setting forth parallel property form and vesting document examples
that make this point).
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In other words, the costs that drive the courts to enforce the
numerous clausus in the property form context are fundamentally
similar to the costs caused by vesting document heterogeneity.
The same can be said in other contexts, as well. Take, for
example, the issue of third-party property rights heterogeneity,
discussed above. Variability in this area of the law prevents potential
creditors from uniformly assessing property rights and lending risk.
As another example, consider co-ownership, a topic identified in the
property law taxonomy, set forth above. There is variability here in
that different jurisdictions grant different rights and assign different
responsibilities to the same types of co-ownership interests.115 There
are no uniform rules or standards, so interested parties must
constantly be on guard for the particularities of a given jurisdiction
or situation. This is so for all creditors and interested parties: those
in a given transaction must take care, of course, but even those who
are merely present in the lending industry generally or who are only
interested in acquiring property must do the same, as there is never
any guarantee of uniformity or "sameness" in any future or
theoretical transaction or purchase.
In other words, the heterogeneity present throughout property
fosters the same sorts of informational burdens identified above,
making it difficult (costly) for anyone interested in property rights (a
very large category, given the significant impact of property in our
economy) to access the right information at the right time. Indeed,
there is no reason to think that the informational burdens created by
heterogeneity are absent in any area of property law. Because
property is fundamentally intended to encompass and convey rights,
its basic lack of heterogeneity necessarily creates confusion and
inconstancy.
As such, the numerus clausus, and its lessons, are theoretically
applicable to all of property. The numerus clausus has traditionally
acted (solely) to foreclose anything other than a standardized set of
property types in order to moderate the costs ultimately borne by
"everyone else," but it should do the same thing elsewhere. How that
would occur-that is, how the numerus clausus would function
broadly in the context of all property law-is addressed below.
B. How
So would the numerus clausus work on a widespread basis? With
respect to property form, this is easy to envision in a practical sense
because it is, in fact, the present state of the law: courts systemically

115. See, e.g., Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing
existence of differing law as to existence of unities of title necessary to creation of joint
tenancy).

532

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:2

limit parties to certain, prescribed categories of property forms.116
How, though, would this work conceptually and practically in other
areas of property?
To examine this, let us turn again to the subcategories discussed
above.117 If the numerus clausus were applied to vesting
heterogeneity, it is likely both that the categories of potential vesting
documents would be reduced and that the content of the categories
remaining would be simplified.118 Similarly, if the numerus clausus
were applied to the third-party rights or co-ownership heterogeneity,
the conflicting laws and contradictory elements associated with these
sorts of property interests would disappear, and a more simplified
schema would replace it.119 There is, however, no reason to think that
property law would settle upon a single property format, that any
particular exemption or limitation on creditor rights would disappear
entirely, or that the rules applicable to co-ownership property types
would regularize across all jurisdictions. Instead, these elements of
heterogeneity would move toward standardization efficiently, seeking
to permit interested parties to gather information in a cost-effective
manner. In Merrill and Smith's terminology, the numerus clausus
would simply move property law toward a level of "optimal
standardization."120

116. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 12-20 (providing an outline of the
various categories of property law).
117. With respect to this discussion, insofar as it relates to vesting heterogeneity,
see Pomeroy, supra note 10, at 987-95.
118. Standardization and simplification are closely related. See, e.g., S. ANIL KUMAR
& N. SURESH, OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 198 (2009). Currently, countless documents
can be filed in the recording system, but, if the numerus clausus were applied, some of
these types of documents would go away because their utility would not justify the
costs they generate. See Pomeroy, supra note 10, at 987-88. The discussion contained
herein of how the numerus clausus would apply to vesting heterogeneity attempts to
apply the numerus clausus concept in an original fashion, starting at a theoretical
point of time in the past. Here, when thinking through how the numerus clausus
would apply to an area of the law to which it has not, in fact, been applied, we must
imagine how the numerus clausus would be applied to a given heterogeneous element
immediately prior to that element's historical adoption. If applied ex ante, in this
fashion, it would prevent the creation of fancies. It would not, however, analyze the
costs inherent in changing the law, though such an examination is interesting in other
contexts. See infra Part IV.
119. Again, the relationship between standardization and simplification would drive
this elimination of inefficient elements of these respective areas of property law. See
KUMAR & SURESH, supra note 118, at 183-85. Creditors would have fewer sources of
rules to grapple with and would be able to more easily assess their contingent rights in
debtor property, and parties would be able to more easily understand the nature of
multiparty ownership property types and issues.
120. Hence the title of Merrill and Smith's article. See Merrill & Smith, supra note
12, at 38. As Merrill and Smith discussed in the property form context, the problem
with the simplicity that comes from total uniformity is that it frustrates parties' goals.
See id. at 35. Instead, the numerus clausus balances simplicity and frustration by
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This move toward optimal standardization, as postulated by
Merrill and Smith in the context of property form, can be represented
in graphic format:121

Cost
Frustration Cost
formation Burden Cost

Q

0
Property Forms

Here, the x-axis is the number of property forms allowed, the y-axis
is cost incurred by society, and the two cost curves measure the social
cost caused by unfettered freedom and the frustration costs caused
by limits on agency.122 By superimposing these cost curves on each
other, the numerus clausus results in a rough equilibrium at point *,
which creates the "correct" number of property formats-that is, a
number of different formats that balances frustration costs and
informational burdens and so minimizes overall cost. 123
If the numerus clausus were applied broadly to all property law,
this same optimization would occur throughout all property
categories. We can see this in more detail by applying the above
analysis to the areas of property law discussed above.
Let us start again with vesting heterogeneity and apply the
numerus clausus theory by examining the trust deed, a common
vesting document.124 Because the deed of trust was created in direct
response to a limitation inherent in prior existing mortgage
documents, it is possible to hypothetically apply a "vesting
heterogeneity numerus clausus" analysis by balancing the frustration

balancing informational burdens with creativity and ingenuity.
121. See Pomeroy, supra note 10, at 990-91 (setting forth the graph, derived from
Merrill and Smith's graphic representation).
122. See id. (explaining these cost curves in detail).
123. See id. at 993.
124. See id. at 993-94. This is particularly useful here, given the relatively recent
creation of the trust deed document as a solution to the problem posed by prior
mortgage documents' failure to permit effective foreclosure. See id. (citing DUKEMINIER
ET AL., supra note 5, at 616-21).
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cost that exists absent the document against the marginal
informational burden cost of the document. In other words, we must
determine whether the trust deed "decreases frustration costs by an
amount that is greater than its concomitant increase in
informational burden costs."125 To do this, the model discussed above
could be modified to reflect its application to vesting documents as
follows:126

Cost
Frustration Cost
formation Burden Cost

Q

0
Vesting Documents

Again, then, the two axes result in two cost curves,127 and the
numerus clausus analysis would seek to determine whether a world
with trust deeds is at, or to the left of, point *. If it is, then the
frustration costs of not permitting that type of document exceed the
costs of permitting it, so the world would be better off if trust deeds
were permitted. A world with trust deeds is to the right of point *,
however, if the frustration costs associated with losing the trust deed
are less than the informational burdens created by having a new
document. The theoretical result of this analysis is not critical-what
is important is to note the manner in which the numerus clausus
analysis can be applied. 128

125. Id. at 992.
126. Id. at 992-93 (setting forth this graph and explaining that the x-axis is the
number of categories of vesting documents permissible and that the y-axis is the
generic cost incurred by society).
127. As above, both of these are curves because the costs at issue marginally
increase or decrease in sync with the x-axis.
128. It seems likely that a numerus clausus analysis here would have permitted the
creation of trust deeds, as the frustration costs (not being able to avoid a costly and
difficult foreclosure process involving the equity of redemption) seems to exceed the
heterogeneity costs created by the creation of a new document. See id. at 990-93.
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And it can be applied to all areas of property law. To
demonstrate this, let us return to third-party property rights and coownership, two of the topics discussed above.129 Again, conceive of a
simplified world wherein the substantive aspects of co-ownership and
all third-party property rights are basically the same across all
jurisdictions. Though these two areas of property law are less easily
compartmentalized than vesting (because there are not analogues to
distinct vesting documents), it is nevertheless possible to conceive of
the hypothetical effect of the numerus clausus here. Each desired
departure from the standardized rules of co-ownership and thirdparty property rights would have to balance the frustration costs that
would exist without that new departure against the costs that arise
from permitting a variety of co-ownership and third-person property
rights and rules.
Take, as a dual example, third-party rights in property held as
tenants by the entirety and the rules regarding creation of joint
tenancy. In both circumstances, the law varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction: different jurisdictions grant creditors differing rights in
marital property and have differing rules regarding whether one
must utilize a straw buyer to create a joint tenancy including the
grantor.130
The numerus clausus would not necessarily have eliminated all
differing elements associated with third-party property rights or
imposed a standardized rule as to the creation of a joint tenancy
including the grantor. Tenancy by the entirety is a relatively unique
property interest that developed in response to a need to
accommodate joint ownership in the marital context, given the
perceived unity of husband and wife.131 Importantly, it arose to fulfill
the need for marital ownership and evolved over time, in response to
relevant social and legal changes regarding the rights of women. 132
Similarly, joint tenancy historically involved a common law fiction
that joint tenants are one, thereby permitting them to take by right
of survivorship, an important aspect of co-ownership.133 Similarly,
the differences here arose due to modern pressures and views of legal

129. See supra Part II.A.
130. See Carrozzo, supra note 47; Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980).
131. See Carrozzo, supra note 47, at 436 ("[This oneness of person made true
concurrent ownership by husband and wife a legal, albeit fictitious, impossibility.
Thus, it was necessary for land to be owned in its entirety by the marital unit of
husband and wife." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
132. See id. at 436-46.
133. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 320. This fiction required that all joint
tenants be equal in all aspects of ownership, including time of acquisition, and this
necessarily meant that a grantor could not create a joint tenancy in himself and
another by a direct conveyance. See id. at 320-21.
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technicalities applied to an old, rigid doctrine. 134 It is clear, then, that
these differences (the differing rights of third parties in tenancy by
the entirety and the different rules regarding creation of joint
tenancy) result from a complex history of legal and cultural
differences underlying significant aspects of local law and have
resulted in varying rules in numerous jurisdictions.135 The numerus
clausus, from an original position, would account for these concerns.
Let us again apply the model set forth above, this time to coownership and third-party rights:

Cost
Frustration Cost
nformation Burden Cost

Q

0
Heterogeneous Rights/Rules

The x-axis here would be the number of third-party property rights
or joint-tenancy creation rules extant. At 0, there would be a single
regime applicable to all jurisdictions (in the case of third-party
rights, a single rule as to what rights creditors could achieve in
tenancies by the entirety, and, in the case of co-ownership, a single
rule as to the creation of a joint tenancy by the grantor). At Q, on the
other hand, there would exist whatever number the various
jurisdictions desired to create. Once more, the y-axis would measure
the costs associated with the resultant curves: the fewer peculiarities
permitted, the higher the frustration costs and the lower the
information burden costs; and the more peculiarities permitted, the
lower those frustration costs and the higher those information
burden costs.
As above, the numerus clausus would seek not ultimate
simplicity but optimization. It would permit the varying third-party
rights associated with tenancy by the entirety or the creation of

134.
135.

See id.
See id. at 320-22; Carrozzo, supra note 47, at 445-46.
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grantor joint tenancy by way of a direct transfer if doing so would
place the law at, or to the left of, point * because, there, the
frustration costs of not permitting varied third-party property rights
or creative freedom would exceed the cost of permitting it. Again,
given the historical antecedents of both tenancy by the entirety and
joint tenancy, it is possible that the numerus clausus would permit
heterogeneity in these circumstances, so long as it established (in the
context of existing conceptual strictures) a necessary form of married
ownership or a useful expedient in the creation of joint ownership,
given all relevant circumstances and considerations.
This, then, is how a widespread heterogeneity numerus clausus
would take effect-on a case-by-case basis, continually evaluating
new or different property rules to balance the extent to which such
newness benefits the law with the extent to which that same
newness harms the legal system. 136 In the context of property form,
the numerus clausus has put a brake upon individual creativity in
the name of wider efficiency and thereby reduced the number of
potential property forms, and it would do the same wherever applied
in property law. It would oppose individual creativity-whether in
creating new vesting documents, creating different third-party
property rights, or permitting new methods of joint tenancy
creation-in the name of efficiency and simplify the law whenever
heterogeneity costs incurred would exceed the frustration costs of
prohibition.
IV. WHY HETEROGENEITY IS SO WIDESPREAD

Given the theoretically justifiable application of the numerus
clausus across all areas of property law, why has this not occurred?
Merrill and Smith persuasively point to the informational burdens
that would result if property law permitted an open suite of property
types as an explanation for the uniquely stable nature of property's
system of estates.1sl I have argued that these informational burdens
similarly result from the heterogeneity that is baked into other areas
of property law, as well. If this is correct, though, why is the rest of
common property law so stubbornly heterogeneous?
The short answer, here, is that this question is largely beyond

136. This is if such an analysis were applied prospectively. See infra note 143. This
section applies the numerus clausus concept to property law concepts in an original
fashion, starting at a theoretical point of time in the past. That is, it does not attempt
to analyze the costs inherent in changing existing law. To apply the numerus clausus
doctrine on a retroactive basis-that is, to ask to what extent it could be utilized to
actually roll back the documents now available (which is, of course, what would be
required for all categories of property law, other than property form)-would have to
account for the additional costs associated with upsetting existing practice and
expectations. See infra Part IV.
137. See supraPart II.B.
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the scope of this article. The primary thesis of this Article is that the
informational burdens identified and analyzed by Merrill and Smith
are present elsewhere in property and that the presence of these
burdens and costs explains, in part, the stubbornly difficult and
challenging nature of property law, from both a student's and from a
practitioner's point of view. It is not entirely clear from the research
set forth and examined here precisely why it is that the
informational burdens associated with property format heterogeneity
had a stabilizing influence, while those associated with other areas of
property law have not had a similar influence.138
This Article does not, then, proffer a reason why the numerus
clausus has not had a greater effect on property law, from an ex ante
point of view. It is possible, however, to draw upon the research
herein and to suggest a reason why the law has not changed, or
adapted, in response to the hypothetical numerus clausus pressures
discussed herein. This is a different question in that it acknowledges
that courts may alter their course once they have seen the benefits
(either practical or academic) of a particular doctrine or view of the
law. But here they do not.So a more refined question is, given the
widespread discussion and analysis of the numerus clausus (and its
application to property format), why have courts not attempted to
streamline property law at any point in time, either in reviewing new
issues or in changing prior law or precedent?
In order to understand this lack of adaptation, let us return to
the graphic representation of the numerus clausus, set forth above:

138. Of course, one potential explanation is that it is not really the informational
burdens identified by Merrill and Smith that explain property format homogeneity.
Such a claim, incipient herein, would not suggest that informational burdens do not
result from variation-instead, it would propose that these burdens are present
everywhere in property law and hence cannot be the driving force behind the relatively
unique homogeneity of property format. Another potential argument is that the agent
of substantive property form law differs from the agent of other aspects of property
law. See Pomeroy, supra note 10, at 987-95. "In the context of property forms, the
agent of implementation has been the court system." Id. at 994-95 (citing Merrill &
Smith, supra note 12, at 9-10 (discussing the numerus clausus as a "norm of judicial
self-governance")). That the courts have not historically become as involved in some
other areas of property law is perhaps because many of these other areas have been
largely addressed legislatively. See id. This deference for legislative autonomy can be
seen even in the property format, given the legislative addition of new property
formats such as condominium interests and time-shares. See Heller, supra note 21, at
1176 n.62. It would seem reasonable, then, that the courts would similarly decline to
become involved, or attempt to impose a numerus clausus regime, in other areas
generally falling within the legislative realm. Neither of these potential arguments,
however, is within the scope of this Article.
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Cost
Frustration Cost
I formation Burden Cost

Q

0
Generic Heterogeneity

As discussed above, this demonstrates the manner in which the
numerus clausus balances the advantages of newness and creativity
against the disadvantages, or costs, of the same. And, again, this
makes sense from an original position-that is, from that point in
time where the law is being formed.
However, to apply the numerus clausus doctrine on a retroactive
basis-to ask to what extent it could be utilized to actually roll back
and change the law as it currently stands-would involve a different
examination in that such an analysis would have to account for the
additional costs associated with upsetting existing practice and
expectations. This different analysis would involve the same
balancing, but it would shift the frustration cost curve to the right:
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This shift would occur, in a retroactive attempt at applying the
numerus clausus, because reducing heterogeneity (or "Q") would
involve not just the frustration of not being able to utilize creative or
new property concepts-it would also involve the enormous expense
and difficulty of changing the current landscape. That is, there would
be a very significant "rollback" cost wherein prior manifestations of
property heterogeneity would have to be altered to conform with the
new homogenous world.
As an example, imagine attempting to impose the numerus
clausus on vesting heterogeneity after the development of the grant,
bargain, and sale deed (a "GBS deed"), as it is utilized in a given
jurisdiction (here, Nevada).139 The GBS deed is in the same category
as the special warranty or general warranty deed, but it creates
different legal obligations and rights, and so is a clear example of
vesting document heterogeneity.140 There is some reason to think
that the numerus clausus doctrine would not permit the development
of such a "fancy" if it were applied in an ex ante manner, as the
benefits of permitting this new type of vesting document likely would
not equal or exceed the informational burdens arising from an
additional document of such a nature.141 If, though, the numerus

139. Nevada is not special and merely serves as an example. This example and
much of this discussion comes from Pomeroy, supra note 10, at 987-95. In Nevada, a
GBS deed differs from a warranty deed in that it does not come with all of the implied
warranties inherent in warranty deeds and in that these GBS deed covenants do not
run with the land. Id. at 989.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 993. ("If it is to the right of [point *] .. [t]he frustration costs associated
with losing the unique characteristics and attributes of the GBS deed are less than the
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clausus were imposed at the present, in an ex post manner, the costs
associated with eliminating the GBS deed would not be limited to the
frustration costs arising from losing the unique characteristics and
attributes of the GBS deed. Instead, it would include the costs of
repealing such a document-of correcting future users of the
document, of purging old documents from the property system, and of
addressing the complications bound to arise from this sort of
undertaking. This is what shifts the frustration curve to the right,
thereby moving point * farther toward Q-i.e., permitting greater
heterogeneity than might otherwise be anticipated.
This, then, is an explanation as to why the numerus clausus has
not acted upon the existing state of property heterogeneity.142 This
increased cost associated with changing the current system (as
opposed to adopting it initially) explains the differing levels of
homogeneity associated with property format and the other areas of
property law discussed herein, notwithstanding the similar
informational burdens inherent in all of property law. 143
CONCLUSION

Property law is unique among core legal subjects in that it is
highly, highly variable. Different states, different counties, different
courts-every conceivable lawmaking unit propounds seemingly
different and varied rules regarding nearly every category of
property law. Except one: as Merrill and Smith have shown, property
form is uniquely simple and uniform. This can be explained, they
heterogeneity costs created by the addition of the GBS deed to our recordable oeuvre,
and the world would be better off without the new document.").
142. As discussed in SVD, this does not mean that the numerus clausus, and the
efficiency it seems to offer, is necessarily out of reach. See Pomeroy, supra note 10,
Part IV.B. The institution of a numerus clausus type of doctrine could still come from
the legislature (though it would likely have to be federal in nature, given the varied
interests and activities of the various state legislatures). Of course, this has not yet
occurred. See id. Another possibility is the free market. Id. at 995. A market-based
source, or demand, for uniform property rules and mores could conceivably become
significant enough that it could create a system of "network effects" influential enough
to drive parties to standardization. Id. at 995-96 ("Network effects exist when one
party's adoption of a particular format or standard has positive consequences for other
adopters of the same."). Given that, it seems possible that the free-market could
promulgate and demand uniform property rules with enough vigor to become a sort of
de facto standard. Id. at 996. Such a system would not be perfect and would not as
strongly force standardization as would the courts or the legislature. Id. at 997. It is,
however, a possible solution to the problems associated with the informational costs
identified herein.
143. This may be a problem of a particularly acute nature in the context of property
law, given the importance of recording here. See supra Part II.A. The recording system
concretely memorializes past practice and any change thereto would involve
significant cost and difficulty. Arguably, that sort of necessity, the need to reach
backward in time and adjust existing rights and upset existing expectations based on
prior practices, is much less clear in other areas of the law.
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claim, by the numerus clausus, a theory that effectively reduces
heterogeneity in order to avoid the information burden and cost that
would be incurred by everyone if the law permitted people to utilize
whatever property forms they desired.
I agree that the application of the numerus clausus is an
important insight and have previously suggested that it could,
theoretically, apply to vesting documents, as well. Here, I go even
further and suggest that it should apply to all areas of property law.
All of property law is undermined by heterogeneity-whether one
considers variability in the context of property form, vesting
documents, or third-party property rights, one finds the same
information burden and cost cited by Merrill and Smith in applying
the numerus clausus to property form.
And, if it were so applied to other areas of property law, it would
operate the same way it does to property form: it would restrict
creativity and heterogeneity generally but not entirely, permitting
new and different elements when the benefit of doing so outweighs
the informational burden of doing so. This makes sense and would
benefit our system, but it likely has not yet occurred because the law
is too well developed and too entrenched to countenance such
significant change. Implementing anything like the numerus clausus
would cause too many difficulties and create too much cost due to the
difficulty of attempting to rollback years and years of established
usage and precedent. Still, if there were a way to implement the
numerus clausus, this would immeasurably improve property law's
ability to accomplish its purpose of providing information to
everyone, something that is sorely called for.

